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IMAGINING CHILDREN'S RIGHTS
SUELLYN SCARNECCHIA*
On the day that Nelson Mandela was elected President of South
Africa, my husband and I happily told oureight year old son Robert
that this, indeed, was a day for celebration. At last, everyone in
South Africa could vote. Without hesitation, Robert asked, "Can the
children vote, too?"
Robert plays the role in our family of providing the child's voice.
He is our window into how the world appears to one little eight year
old. In growing up and becoming the adults, the parents, my husband
and I have lost the child's point of view.
In imagining children's rights, I imagine a legal system wherein
the particular views, needs and wants of children are given voice and
respect. That vision - a legal system wherein the particular views,
needs and wants of children are given voice and respect - now
exists only in our imaginations and is viewed as ridiculous and even
dangerous to some.
Today, I will tell you some stories about real, live children,
whose futures have been determined by our legal system. To speak
of children's rights hypothetically, raises images of children suing to
go live with their rich uncle or suing to demand a Nintendo system
from their parents. I hope that by bringing you stories of the legal
system's treatment of real children, you will have a better understand-
ing of what I mean by children's rights and why they must be
recognized. Although children's rights have been recognized in
limited ways in the areas of free speech,1 criminal law' and repro-
ductive rights3, a child's rights in the context of custody decisions
have not been recognized - those decisions continue to revolve
around the rights of the adults battling for possession of a child.
I ask you to imagine children's rights, because I do think it takes
imagining to view children as rights-bearing citizens, and not as the
property of their biological parents. Professor Stone in his 1972
article "Should Trees Have Standing?"4 wrote:
* Clincial Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School; J.D., Michigan,
1981; attorney for Jan & Roberta DeBoer, the prospective adoptive parents of "Baby Jessica,"
in their Michigan and U.S. Supreme Court litigation. See pp. 286-287, Infra.
1. Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
2. in re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
3. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
4. Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? - Toward Legal Rights For
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[E]ach time there is a movement to confer rights onto some new
"entity," the proposal is bound to sound odd or frightening or
laughable. This is partly because until the rightless thing receives its
rights, we cannot see it as anything but a thing for the use of "us" -
those who are holding rights at the time.'
The tempting alternative to recognizing children's rights is to
simply blame these difficult cases on the adults. To say, if only the
adults had made better judgments along the way, then this would not
have happened. This became the easy way to dismiss the Baby
Jessica case. Well, if the birth mother hadn't lied about the birth
father's identity; if the prospective adoptive parents had just given the
baby back right away; if the courts had worked faster .... But none
of these answers, so clear in hindsight and not so clear at the time
decisions were made by the parties, protects the next child who comes
along. When you listen to the cases I describe today, you will hear
of many different ways in which courts are led to this Solomon-like
decision. Blaming the adults makes us feel better, but it does not
address the underlying failure to recognize the child as a person who
is independently affected by the actions of the other parties. Adults
and their lawyers do not necessarily make good judgments in child
custody cases, that is why the child's interests must be given an
independent voice. By concentrating on the adults and their failures,
we continue to render the children and their needs invisible.
THE STORY OF KASSEN
The New Mexico Supreme Court is now considering the fate of
four year old Kassen Roth.6 When Kassen was nine months old, his
birth mother delivered him to an Albuquerque adoption agency and
signed away her parental rights to the little baby.7 She reported to
the agency that the child's father had not supported the family for two
months.8
Kassen had been badly neglected in his birth mother's care.
When he went to his adoptive parents' home, he did not know how
Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 450 (1972).
5. Id. at 455. (footnote omitted).
6. In re JJB, 868 P.2d 1256 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993), cert granted, 869 P.2d 820 (N.M.
Feb. 8, 1994)(No. 21864).
7. In re JJB, 868 P.2d at 1258.
8. Id.
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to cry and he did not know his name. He would eat only if the food
was placed on the floor.9
The Roth family took in Baby Kassen and made him a part of
their family. He overcame his earlier neglect and grew to love his
parents and his two brothers. He had a family.
His father learned of the adoption and contested it immediate-
ly.10 The adoption agency thwarted his attempt to obtain immediate
custody of Kassen." The lower court in New Mexico found by
clear and convincing evidence that his birth father had abandoned
Kassen and thus terminated his parental rights.1 2 The New Mexico
Court of Appeals reversed and ordered Kassen transferred to his birth
father. 3 The New Mexico Supreme Court heard oral arguments in
the case in June 1994 and a decision is pending.
14
The legal question in Kassen's case is whether or not the birth
father's parental rights could be properly terminated at the time of the
adoption.1 5 If his fights were improperly terminated, Kassen will
live with his birth father and lose the family that has nurtured him
from nine months to over four years old. He will lose the people he
loves as his mom and dad. He will lose his two brothers.
THE STORY OF CAMERON AND BRANDON
Cameron and Brandon Baldanza were born a little over a year
apart to a heroin-addicted birth mother who abandoned them both at
the hospital. The birth mother's cousin, Millie Baldanza and her
husband took the boys in. Millie nursed them through the effects of
heroin addiction at birth and loved them as her own. After years of
abandonment, the biological parents contested termination of their
parental rights when the boys were two and three years of age.
9. Scott Sandlin, Parental Appeal: Adoptive Family Criticizes 3-year-old's Early
Care, ALBUQUERQUE J., Dec. 2, 1993, at A10.
10. In re JJB, 868 P.2d at 1258.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1259.
13. Id. at 1256-66.
14. In re JJB, 868 P.2d 1256 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993), cert granted, 869 P.2d 820 (N.M.
Feb. 8, 1994)(No. 21864).
15. In re JLB, (Roth v. Bookert) Supreme Court of New Mexico No. 21864.
Attorney Cynthia A. Fry, counsel for the Roths confirmed over the phone with the author that
the case was argued in June 1994 and a decision is still pending.
1995]
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The New York social services agency began efforts to reunify the
boys with their birth parents. In fact, the agency began to reunify a
family which had never existed. This reunification process continues
today. The boys are four and five years old now. They are sent off
to stay with their birth parents for court-ordered visits and return to
the Baldanzas shaken and traumatized.
I have met Millie Baldanza and I heard her speak recently.
1 6
She told this story: One day, one of the brothers held Millie's hand
and brought her to his bedroom to show her how he had cleaned his
room. Millie praised his work and he turned to her and asked, "Now
can we stay with you Mommy?" Millie cannot promise Cameron and
Brandon that they won't lose her.
THE STORY OF EMILY
Prior to the birth of Baby Emily, a Florida judge signed an order
finding her birth father, Gary, to have abandoned the birth mother.'"
Emily was born August 28, 1992. Three days later her prospective
adoptive parents brought her home and soon filed for adoption. The
birth father contested the adoption, in fact he had informed the
attorney who was handling the adoption that he would not consent,
even before the adoption was filed. That attorney did not inform the
adoptive parents nor the court of this conversation with the father.1
In October 1992, after hearing the father's evidence, the court
reversed its earlier decision and found that Gary had not abandoned
the birth mother and so the adoption must fail.19 A rehearing on the
abandonment was granted the next month. The testimony at the
rehearing revealed that Gary had been convicted of rape in the past
and that Gary physically and emotionally abused the birth mother
while she was pregnant with Emily and had provided no support
during the pregnancy.20
In September 1993, the court reversed its earlier ruling and once
again found abandonment by Gary and thus waiver of his consent for
the adoption. Baby Emily's adoption was finalized.21
16. Public Statement at the Conference of the DeBoer Committee for Children's
Rights, in Ann Arbor, MI (Oct. 1, 1994).
17. In re Baby E.A.W., 647 So.2d 918 (Fla.. 1994).
18. Mark Hansen, Fear of the Heart, A.B.AJ. (Nov. 1994).
19. In re Baby E.A.W., 647 So.2d at 918.
20. Id. at 920-21.
21. Id. at 922.
[Vol. 12:1
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The birth father appealed the adoption and on June 22, 1994, a
Florida Appeals Court ruled that Gary did not abandon the birth
mother during pregnancy; that his past criminal record was irrelevant;
the child's best interests were irrelevant; and the abuse of the birth
mother during pregnancy was irrelevant. The adoptive parents
appealed and the entire appeals court bench reversed the first panel
and affirmed the trial court's order granting the adoption. The birth
father has appealed to the Florida Supreme Court. Emily is now
over two years old.
THE STORY OF JULIO
Julio Sanchez was born in 1986 with severe physical complica-
tions. The Orsi's, experienced and licensed foster parents, took him
in at his birth mother's request. Expected to live only one year, Julio
is now eight years old. Despite his severe disabilities, he lives at the
center of the Orsi family where all of the other children interact with
him regularly. He smiles, laughs, plays with toys and loves his
parents and siblings.
Earlier this year the Connecticut Department of Mental Retarda-
tion issued an order to remove Julio from the only home he has ever
known to place him in a group home closer to his birth mother's
town. All of his nurses (eight in total) and his pediatrician have
written affidavits that say he will suffer greatly and could die if
removed from his family.22
THE STORY OF JILLIAN
The Tennessee Supreme Court has recently held that Jillian Bond
was not a party to her bwn adoption and therefore was not permitted
to have counsel represent her. Jillian is seven years old. Her
attorney tells us that "Jillian lives day to day, hoping to be able to
stay with her family (the Bonds) and constantly dreading the knock
on the door that will take her away."'
When she was eight months old, Jillian's birth mother abandoned
her in the care of the Bonds family. At the age of three, the
Tennessee Department of Human Services decided to reunite Jillian
with paternal grandparents - again reuniting a family which never
existed in the first place. While in the care of her paternal grandpar-
22. Letter and Enclosures from Nancy Orsi (Feb. 21, 1995)(On file with author).
23. Letter from Kathleen Mitchell, Jillian Bond's Attorney.
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ents, Jillian was severely sexually abused and eventually returned to
the Bonds family. Later, Jillian's birth mother contested an attempt
by the Bonds family to adopt her.' The Court of Appeals of
Tennessee affirmed the lower court's decision which denied the
Bonds the right to adopt Jillian, but gave permanent custody of Jillian
to the Bonds.5 The birth mother has appealed the custody decision
and the Tennessee Supreme Court agreed to hear the appeal.
After the Tennessee Supreme Court denied standing to Jillian in
her own adoption, her attorney filed suit in the United States District
Court seeking a ruling that Jillian is indeed a person with rights and
is entitled to standing and counsel. That suit is pending."
THE STORY OF RICHARD
In Illinois, Baby Richard's mother placed him for adoption and
told the birth father that the baby had died. When the father found
that the child had been placed for adoption, he contested the adop-
tion.28 Because he had not come forward during the time limits
required under Illinois Adoption law, the trial court granted the
adoption over his protests.29 The Illinois Court of Appeals affirmed
the trial court's grant of the adoption and stated the following:
Fortunately, the time has long past when children in our society were
considered the property of their parents. Slowly, but finally, when it
comes to children even the law has rid itself of the Dred Scott
mentality that a human being can be considered a piece of property
"belonging" to another human being. To hold that a child is the
property of his parents is to deny the humanity of the child.30
In an adoption, custody or abuse case, ... the child is the real party in
interest. [I]t is his best interest and corollary rights that come before
24. In re Bond, No. 03A01-9301-CH-00011, 1993 Tenn. App. LEXIS 757 at *1 (Tenn.
Ct. App. Dec. 10, 1993), cert granted, 1994 Tenn. LEXIS 161 (Tenn. June 6, 1994).
25. In re Bond, 1993 Tenn App LEXIS 757 at *1.
26. Bond v. Burson, No. 3:94-CV-502 (D. Tenn 1994).
27. In re Doe, 627 N.E.2d 648, 649 (111. App. Ct. 1993): 638 N.E.2d 181 (Ill. 1994),
rehearing denied, 638 N.E.2d 181 (Il. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct 499.
28. In re Doe, 647 N.E.2d at 649.
29. Id. at 651. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that the father
had failed to demonstrate any interest in the child during the first thirty days after the birth.
The trial court found the father to be unfit and that his consent to the adoption was not
required.
30. Id. at 651-52.
[Vol. 12:1
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anything else, including the interests and rights of biological and
adoptive parents.31
The case was appealed by the birth father to* the Illinois Supreme
Court, which reversed and ordered that the child be transferred to the
custody of the birth father, who has since married the birth mother.32
The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari on the case this
month.33
While the case was pending, the Illinois legislature passed a law
which will allow Richard's adoptive parents to file for custody of
Richard, once the adoption had failed. The birth father petitioned the
Illinois Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus to have the child
transferred to his custody without a hearing. The Illinois Supreme
Court granted the writ and ordered that the child be transferred
"forthwith." The United States Supreme Court has denied a stay of
the Illinois transfer order, with two justices dissenting.'
The Illinois Supreme Court stated in its decision:
In the opinion below, the appellate court, wholly missing the
threshold issue in this case, dwelt on the best interests of the child.
Since, however, the father's parental interest was improperly terminat-
ed, there was no occasion to reach the factor of the child's best
interests. [The child's best interests] should never have been reached
and need never have been discussed.35
THE STORY OF STEPHANIE
Stephanie Meade was four days old when she went home with
Jim and Jackie Meade, who were her foster parents and eventually
became her legal guardians. She is now eight years old. When she
was three, her birth mother began an attempt to dismiss the guardian-
ship. Stephanie's case has been contested since then., The Meades,
who have raised Stephanie for 8 years, have been denied standing in
Michigan to sue for her custody. Her birth father, who has nothing
31. Id. at 652. See Bennett v. Jeffreys, 356 N.E.2d 277 (N.Y. 1976).
32. In re Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181 (Ill. 1994); rehearing denied, 159 111. 2d 347 (Il1.
1994).
33. In re Doe, 115 S.Ct. 499 (1994).
34. In re Doe, 115 S.Ct 891 (1995).
35. In re Doe, 638 N.E.2d at 182.
19951
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but a biological connection to Stephanie, has come forward to file a
custody case, asking the court to leave Stephanie with the Meades,
the only parents she has ever known.36 The hearing to determine
which home would be in the best interest of Stephanie is scheduled
for 1995 and will mark the first time in five years of litigation that
Stephanie's interests will be considered relevant.
Recently, Jackie Meade, through her tears, relayed this moment
in the life of a little girl who doesn't know when she might lose the
family she loves: Jackie was helping Stephanie tie her shoes. They
were both looking down at her shoes, when Stephanie looked up and
caught Jackie's eyes. She said "You can't help me mommy, can
you?" She had learned that the woman upon whom she depended for
everything was not able to guarantee that they would remain a family.
THE STORY OF THE GRISsOMs
The three Grissom teenagers live with their mother in Missou-
ri.37 Tony, Rachel and Rebecca have testified openly and clearly
that their father abuses them on visits, -including sexual abuse.
"[T]hey refuse to visit him because his behavior frightens them."38
The judge has threatened their mother with jail and the children with
foster care if they don't visit their father.
A children's rights lawyer, Lewis Pitts, attempted to appear on
behalf of the Grissom children, to protect their right to be heard. The
court ruled that the teens had no right to intervene in the case and had
no right to counsel and sanctioned Mr. Pitts for bringing a frivolous
action. The Missouri Court of Appeals agreed that the children could
not intervene or have an attorney in a case involving their custody
and visitation, but reversed the order of sanctions against the
children's attorney.39
THE STORY OF JESSICA
Jessica was placed for adoption, and a man who was not the birth
father was named by the birth mother.4" She was placed with Jan
and Robby DeBoer shortly after her birth and the birth mother
revealed the name of the actual birth father a few weeks later. The
36-. Meade v. Randall, Michigan SC 98617 (1994) (On file with author).
37. Grissom v. Grissom, 886 S.W.2d 47, 51 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. In re Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649, 652 (Mich. 1993).
[Vol. 12:1
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case was litigated for two and a half years and I carried Jessica from
the DeBoers' home and left her with her birth parents, Dan and Cara
Schmidt, who had married when Jessi was fourteen months old.
As a result of the decisions of the Iowa and Michigan courts, it
was ruled that:
1. When deciding between the two families, Jessica's interests were
irrelevant.4'
2. Jessica did not have the right to bring an action in her own name,
to ask the court to determine custody.42
3. Jessica had no constitutional rights separate from the rights of her
biological parents, unless those parents were unfit.4 3 On the
issue of fitness, it was determined that the birth father's prior
abandonment of two other children was irrelevant to the question
of his fitness in Jessi's case.44
Jessica is now called Anna Schmidt and lives with her birth
parents in Iowa. The DeBoers have been denied any contact with the
little girl and have no way of knowing how she is faring other than
what the media is told by the Schmidts. More importantly, Jessi, now
Anna, has never been permitted to see the parents who raised her
from birth and has no idea whether they are still alive and whether
they still love her.
DISCUSSION
I have briefly described nine cases to you. I could easily go on
for hours describing more like them.
For me, the thread that connects these cases, is the failure by the
court to recognize the child as an individual person who has feelings,
who can be hurt and hurt badly. The child in each of these cases is
still the item to be bartered over, the prize at the end of the litigation,
the silenced party to the action.
You should note that the cases I've described are not all
contested adoption cases. The contested adoptions are the most
difficult perhaps, because of our tradition of adoption as an all-or-
41. In the Interest of B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239, 245 (Iowa 1992); In re Clausen, 502
N.W.2d at 660-62 (Mich. 1993).
42. In re Clausen, 502 N.W.2d at 655.
43. Id. at 666-67.
44. In the Interest of B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d at 246. But see, 496 N.W.2d at 247 (Snell,
J., dissenting) (holding abandonment of other children proved abandonment for purposes of
the adoption statute).
1995]
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nothing proposition. You either are the parent or you are not - we
have no tradition of compromise, and thus King Solomon must either
split the baby in two or declare one parent the loser and one the
winner.
But this question of recognizing the needs and interests of
children arises in other settings, too. It arises daily in the context of
foster care cases, wherein the state promises the biological parents
that the children will be reunited with them if the parents change,
while, especially infant children, are busily bonding to the foster
family who cares for them. When the parents are ready to take the
child back, is the child ready to go?
The cases become even more difficult as we attempt to protect
not only the child's biological link to his or her birth parents, but to
anyone who happens to be related. Under the pressure to keep
children with blood relatives, we see twisted decisions, like Lenny's
case in Texas45, which ripped a boy from the foster family that
raised him from birth and from his birth parents, to live with a
biologic brother whom he has never met in Oregon. Or, we see the
Cox case in Wisconsin 6, where two African American girls, raised
by white foster parents, were to be placed with their aunt who had
been pressured to take them because they should be raised inside their
own family and their own race. The fact that one of the girls had
described being abused at the aunt's home on visits and was terrified
to return there was irrelevant.
We have guardianship cases where children have been left to be
raised by nonbiological parents and where the law says the birth
parent can come back and reclaim their property, their children, at
any time. The law usually makes an exception if the birth parent is
unfit. Yet, the definition of unfitness does not include the prior
abandonment and because the birth parent has not had the child in his
or her custody, there is no way to measure the parent's actual fitness
for parenting. We see in Baby Emily's case the law's presumption
in favor of a convicted rapist over the parents who have raised the
child since birth - apparently because he has never had an opportu-
nity to abuse this child, he must be presumed fit.
45. In the Interest of Lenny Vitinner, 105th Judicial District, State of Texas, Cause No.
92-1486-D.
46. Eldon Knoche, Foster girls will remain with Whites, MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, May
20, 1994 at IA, 10A.
[Vol. 12:1
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Finally, we have contested custody or visitation cases between
two birth parents. The right of a noncustodial parent to visit is often
protected at any cost to the child. If one of us is sexually assaulted
or physically beaten by a stranger on the street, we are not forced to
visit that person on a weekly basis, even with a supervisor present.
But, children who have been attacked by a biological parent are
rushed back to the scene of the crime to spend quality time with their
attacker. A child who says, "No, I don't want to see daddy" is
silenced by a court system which is permitted to ignore the child's
voice. A little girl in Michigan was beaten black and blue from the
waist down during a visit to her father's home. Her father pled guilty
to the assault and battery and within a year, the child was visiting
again. Within a few months after visits resumed she was rushed to
the hospital during a visit at her father's home, near death from
having been shaken so violently. I learned of the case when the
mother's attorney called to consult with me about preparing for the
upcoming visitation hearing.47 Yes, the faither had the right to
request continued visits with this little girl.
Many barriers stand in the way of imagining a legal system
wherein the particular views, needs and wants of children are given
voice and respect. They fall generally into two categories:
1. The disbelief that children are actually harmed by custody
decisions which exclude consideration of their interests. You see,
if the children in these cases are resilient and can cope with
change, then why should we be concerned? Adult-centered
custody decisions would be acceptable.
2. The strength of our legal and social tradition which places
biological links above links formed by love and relationship. The
idea that a child might have a protectable interest in his or her
relationship with someone other than blood relatives, flies in the
face of our traditional definitions of family and of parental rights.
I believe these two barriers to meaningful children's rights in the
context of custody cases are related. Our understanding of children
and what it means to be a child has advanced tremendously during
the 20th century. At the same time, our legal system has been
bombarded with the need to respond to social changes. The cases I
have described today reflect an intersection of social and legal change
which has not yet been resolved, which may seem too dangerous and
threatening to resolve, but which cries out for resolution.
47. Telephone Interview with Jane Bader, Attorney at Law.
1995]
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On the social side, we have greatly advanced understanding of
children and their needs. Experts in early childhood development began
to describe for us the process of bonding and attachment - the natural
process between a child and one or two adults which creates the
building blocks for the child's physical, psychological and intellectual
development. Indeed, it was discovered that when a baby did not
emotionally attach to an adult, because of neglect, the child could
actually stop growing, physically and emotionally, resulting in a
condition called failure to thrive. The child's very existence is
dependant on someone responding to his cries, on feeding her when
she's hungry, on holding and caressing him, so that growing up can be
faced with some sense of security.
Experts in early childhood development began to recognize that
once a child was around six months old, the identity of the adult
caregiver mattered to the child. Children begin to know when they are
left with strangers. As they get older, their attachment to the adult or
adults they know as parents becomes more and more necessary to their
growth and development. Experts in children's mental health advocated
for continuity in a child's relationships with adults and for secure
attachments between children and adults.
When the Baby Jessica case was filed in Michigan, we knew that
the Michigan courts.could not finalize an Iowa adoption, so we were
requesting that the DeBoers be permitted to keep physical custody of
Jessica, that they become her legal custodians. Dan Schmidt would
remain her legal father and have the right to visit and know her as she
grew older. The trial court in Michigan held a hearing on what would
be in the best interests of Jessica, regarding her custody, not an
adoption. The trial lasted eight days and six experts testified. The trial
court held by clear and convincing evidence that Jessi should remain in
the custody of the DeBoers. His decision was reversed on appeal.
The trial witnesses who included psychologists, social workers, an
infant mental health expert, and a psychoanalyst, all testified that
Jessica's loss of her attachment to Robby and Jan DeBoer would hurt
her. In summarizing this testimony, the trial judge said: "We had
different degrees of testimony from the experts. All the way from
permanent, serious damage, she would never recover from, down to the
child would recover in time. But every expert testified that there would
be serious traumatic injury to the child at this time."(emphasis
added).48
48. In re Clausen, 502 N.W.2d at 669. (quoting Circuit Judge William F. Ager, Jr.).
[Vol. 12:1
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Any expert asked would likely agree that we should not remove
a two year old child from the parents to whom the child is attached
unless we are required to remove her. Often, we are required to
remove children from their parents because the parents have abused
or neglected them. We are to do this only when the child's safety
requires removal. That was not the case for Baby Jessica - by all
accounts the DeBoers had provided good and proper care and she had
a healthy relationship with them. The only other circumstance under
which the state removes children from parents with whom they have
bonded is when another adult makes a better or stronger legal claim
to the right to custody of the child.
So, the experts agree that removing a child like Baby Emily,
from her adoptive parents in Florida is likely to harm her. But,
perhaps we aren't as worried about Baby Emily and her future now
that we have seen that Baby Jessica, after moving to another family
and changing her name to Anna is just fine. Two television shows
and Newsweek magazine have rushed to tell a nation mourning Baby
Jessica's loss of her family, that Anna Schmidt is a happy, healthy
girl with no apparent scars from the transfer of custody.4 9 In fact
the Newsweek story was so anxious to reassure us that the newly
named Anna is fine that they titled their piece "She's Not Baby
Jessica Anymore: A Family Visit One Year Later." This "one year
later" article appeared in the March 21, 1994 issue of Newsweek,
only 7 months after her transfer to Iowa.
And these pictures of the new Anna smiling and playing with her
birth parents and baby sister have reassured many. We apparently do
believe everything we see on TV. In writing an amicus brief for the
Baby Richard case in Illinois, I cited evidence, gathered from Baby
Jessica's case, of harm which a child Richard's age would suffer if
he lost his adoptive parents.50 An attorney reviewing the brief for
me, for possible filing with the United States Supreme Court, wrote
to me and suggested that I should not use the evidence concerning
harm to Jessi in light of recent media reports that she's okay. Just as
the media image of Jessi being ripped from her house in Ann Arbor
49. Michele Ingrassia, She's Not Baby Jessica Anymore, A Family Visii One Year
Later, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 21, 1994, at 60; American Journal (ABC television broadcast, Nov.
1993); Prime Time (ABC television broadcast Mar. 10, 1994).
50. Amicus Brief in Support of Baby Boy Janikova, 638 N.E. 2d 181 (111. 1994)
(No. 1-92-1552).
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moved the nation, the media image of her playing and laughing with
the Schmidts reassured the nation that everything is all right now.
You won't be surprised, I am sure, when I suggest that these
images of the new Anna do not tell the whole story. The experts who
predicted harm to Jessica never said that she would never laugh and
play again. In fact, most of them said that after she overcame the
immediate pain and loss, she was unlikely to experience problems
until her adolescent or early adult years where issues of trust in close
relationships will become more central to her.
But, what about the pain she suffered in 1993 when she lost her
parents? Do we have to see a child suffer long-lasting and agonizing
pain to make it relevant to the custody decision? Are we willing to
ignore a child's pain because she is too young to explain it to us? Is
the pain forgivable if she grows up and consciously forgets it? If
Jessica would have been physically harmed by the change in custody
would any court have allowed it? If she had broken an arm and it
healed within six months, would this have been acceptable? Psycho-
logical pain and suffering can be invisible, especially in a young child
who does not yet express herself as adults would.
In the Newsweek interview entitled "She's Not Baby Jessica
Anymore" Cara Schmidt told the reporter that Jessica, who was last
seen by the public screaming "Daddy, Daddy" as I carried her out of
the home, stopped crying when she saw Cara.51 I had mixed
emotions when I read that sentence. I knew it was not true. In fact,
Jessica had stopped crying and had calmed down during the ride from
one family to the other. But, when we exited the van and saw Cara
and Dan, Jessica refused to let go of my arm and would not let me
hand her to them. After some unsuccessful attempts at turning her
over directly to Cara, I brought Jessica to the Schmidts' van and
coaxed her into entering the van by promising that she could see a
new car seat the Schmidts had brought for her. Dan and Cara then
entered the van after Jessica. I had mixed feelings because I knew
that Cara's description of that day was not true, but I understood why
she would want to believe it was true and why she would need the
public to believe it was true. The Schmidts have set about retelling
Jessica's story, so that Anna's story will begin to make sense.
We all place ourselves in a convenient state of denial if we allow
ourselves to believe that Jessi, now Anna, was not hurt when she lost
51. INGRASSIA ET AL., supra note 49.
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her loving family. We are able to reach this state of denial, however,
because we do not want to believe that we can stand by and watch a
child be intentionally harmed and because Baby Jessica was too
young to speak for herself. We do not hear anyone asking Anna
whether or not she would like to go back to the DeBoers or to at least
visit them. We see a little girl who had no choice, whose interests
were not considered, making the best of what the courts and all of her
parents have handed her.
We learn much from older children of course, like Jenny Yang
from Grand Rapids, who at the age of twelve was forced to testify
that her birth parents were unfit, in order to remain with the family
who had raised her since birth.52 Jenny testified that she had
considered suicide as an alternative to losing the only family she had
ever known.53
This first major barrier, then, to recognition of the child's right
to have his or her interests considered in all custody decisions is our
collective failure to recognize that a child is hurt when he or she loses
an established family and perhaps our collective disbelief that the
harm to the child is significant enough to overcome the rights of
biological parents.
In fact, the legal system has accepted the premise learned from
psychology that a child needs continuity and stability when a custody
dispute is between two biological parents. In 1973, Goldstein, Freud
and Solnit published Beyond the Best Interest of the Child.54 As an
interdisciplinary team of authors, they outlined basic needs of a child
and described how these needs should be respected in the context of
custody decisions.55 Many states adopted their conclusions and at
least where the battling parents were both birth parents, we saw legal
reform in response to a new understanding of children. The psycho-
logical world and the legal world joined hands to improve decisions
concerning children.
Here in Michigan, for instance, a trial court is to presume that a
child will remain in the custody of the parent with whom the child
has an established custodial environment. An established custodial
environment exists where "over an appreciable time the child
52. Yang v. Hong, 509 N.W.2d 157 (Mich. App. 1993).
53. Girl Spoke of Suicide Before Trial, ANN ARBOR NEWS, Oct. 26, 1993.
54. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD (1973).
55. Id.
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naturally looks to the custodian in that environment for guidance,
discipline, the necessities of life and parental comfort.
5 6
This happy marriage of two disciplines greatly concerned about
children, law and psychology, fails though when the custody battle
pits a birth parent against a parent not related to the child by blood.
This brings me to the second major barrier to imagining a legal
system wherein the particular views, needs and wants of children are
given voice and respect. That is, the legal system's strong tradition
of protecting the rights of biological parents.
In ancient times, parents could openly treat children as property
- selling them, beating them, marrying them off for profit, even
killing them.57 In modem times the right of parents to treat their
children as their property has been tempered. There are minimal
standards which all parents must meet or the state may remove from
parents children who are abused and neglected. There is a legal
tradition, therefore, which supports the conclusion reached by the
Supreme Court of Michigan in Jessica's case, when the court stated:
It is true that children, as well as their parents, have a due process
liberty interest in their family life. However, in our view those
interests are not independent of the child's parents. The mutual right
of the parent and child come into conflict only when there is a
showing of parental unfitnes.58
To support this view that children had no rights independent of
their birth parents, the Michigan Supreme Court depended, in part, on
authority from earlier Michigan Supreme Court decisions from 1938,
1944, 1945 and 1961."9 In all of those cases, the trial courts, who
saw the witnesses, ordered that a child remain with his or her
psychological parents, the parents with whom the child had built an
attachment. In each of those cases, the Supreme Court of Michigan
reversed the trial courts, ordering the child transferred to the custody
of the biological parent, because the biological parent had not been
found unfit. The biological parent's lengthy absence from the child's
life was not viewed as unfitness.
56. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.27(c) (West 1993).
57. SToNE, supra, note 4 at 451.
58. In re Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649, 665 (Mich. 1993).
59. Id. at 666-67.
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In 1976, the Supreme Court of Michigan was faced with facts
similar to the Baby Jessica case in a case called In re Weldon6°.
The Weldon court left the child in the custody of her adoptive
parents. 1 In her majority opinion, former Chief Justice Mary
Coleman wrote the following:
Many eloquent words have been written and spoken concerning
"the best interests of the child" only to evolve into an analysis of rights
of parents and others as to a piece of property. To minimize these
regrettable results, the Child Custody Act was passed and hailed as
implanting in our statutes the humane and progressive mandate that
children are people who havethe same unalienable rights as all other
citizens. As such, children are deserving of the right to those liberties
in which physical, mental and emotional growth are essential. They
are endowed with a right to the "pursuit of happiness." 62
By 1992, the Supreme Court of Michigan had reversed its
decision in In re Weldon63, and instead relied on its earlier line of
cases, from the 1940's, which protected the right to custody of birth
parents. a The promise that Michigan children would be recognized
as possessing inherent rights was forgotten.
In light of the nine cases I described to you earlier and others, it
is clear that courts all over the United States are unwilling to view the
child as an independent actor when the child's interests clash with
those of biological parents. I want to quickly suggest some reasons
for this:
FIRST. A fear that all biological parents will be at risk of losing
their children if some lose their children.
SECOND. A belief that in the long run, children are always better
off with their blood relatives, even if this flies in the face of what
experts and what children themselves say.
THIRD. Established precedent recognizing a constitutional right
in birth parents to protect their relationship with their children. And,
no parallel precedent recognizing the right of children to protect their
relationships with nonbiological parents.
FOURTH. Our confusion over definitions of family. Granting
birth parents certain rights over their children occurred along with a
presumption that the parents would likely be married to one another
60. 244 N.W.2d 827 (1976) rev'd by Bowie v. Arder, 490 N.W.2d 568 (1992).
61. In re Weldon, 244 N.W.2d at 837-45.
62. Id. at 837.
63. Id.
64. Bowie, 490 N.W.2d at 577-80.
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and that the parents would not be crack or heroin addicts, would not
be convicted rapists and would not have a history of abandoning other
children in their past. Certainly, the contested adoption cases like
Jessica's, Richard's, Emily's and Kassen's would not have been
possible in the years when unwed fathers had no rights vis a vis an
adoption.
Thetefore, a decision must be made. Sfate legislatures and courts
must decide just what to do with the harm caused by separating a
child from the nonbiological parents he or she loves. Will we ignore
the pain and expect children to survive whatever we throw at them?
Or, will we begin to fashion rules and recognize rights which
acknowledge that children are not fungible articles which can be
traded between homes like other pieces of property?
There are risks involved in beginning to protect nonbiological
relationships between children and adults. We risk being terribly
unfair to well-intentioned birth parents who did not intend to abandon
a child. We risk making it more difficult for parents who need
support to turn to others for help - they will have reason to fear that
if the child is in the care of others long enough, the child will not be
returned. We risk the promotion of pseudo-kidnapping, rewarding
badly intentioned adults who hold on to a child long enough to make
it harmful to remove the child.
Certainly, some childreh will still suffer the harm of losing a
psychological parent. If a person actually kidnaps a child, the child
must be returned to the birth parent regardless of the effect on the
child. This is one obvious place where the law should ignore
psychology and deter crime instead. Also, we will always be making
judgments about which adults have an attachment to the child and
sometimes we'll be wrong and the child will suffer.
Limitations must be placed on the protection of nonbiological
parent-child relationships. A child must be in the psychological
parent's care for a minimum amount of time, for instance, before the
adult may sue for custody. When a child has lived for a long time
with another adult, but has maintained his or her attachment to the
birth parent, then the child should be returned to the birth parent.
Birth parents who voluntarily leave their children in the care of others
must be provided an opportunity, if they choose, to maintain their
relationships.
But, if a birth parent does not or cannot continue an attachment
or has never formed an attachment with the child, the birth parent
must not be permitted to simply reclaim the child without regard to
the effect on the child of losing his or her established family.
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Rather than giving weight to precedent which treats children as
the property of their biological parents, courts must begin to recog-
nize the humanity of children, to recognize that at times the interests
of children differ from the interests of their birth parents, and to
recognize that no decision concerning a child's custody should be
made without regard to how it will affect the life of the child.
Justice Blackmun authored a four paragraph dissent to the
DeShaney case, a case involving the right of a child to sue a state
agency which may have had a duty to protect him from abuse.65
The majority found that the child had no right to sue the agency.6
Justice Blackmun pointed out the judicial courage which is required
to recognize rights which have not been recognized before. This
dissent could certainly appear at the end of the Baby Jessica or Baby
Richard decisions as well:
Today, the Court purports to be the dispassionate oracle of the
law, unmoved by "natural sympathy." But, in this pretense, the Court
itself retreats into a sterile formalism which prevents it from recogniz-
ing either the facts of the case before it or the legal norms that should
apply to those facts.
Like the antebellum judges who denied relief to fugitive slaves,
the Court today claims that its decision, however harsh, is compelled
by existing legal doctrine. On the contrary, the question presented by
this case is an open one, and our Fourteenth Amendment precedents
may be read more broadly or narrowly depending upon how one
chooses to read them. Faced with the choice, I would adopt a
"sympathetic" reading, one which comports with dictates of fundamen-
tal justice and recognizes that compassion need not be exiled from the
province of judging.67
If our imaginings of a legal system wherein the particular views,
needs and wants of children are given voice and respect, are to
become reality, then several things must occur. I wil list my
suggestions for reform here:
1. Pass legislation which treats the interests of the child or the
potential harm to the child as a legitimate consideration of the
court anytime a child's custody is at issue. This would potentially
require reform of our adoption, custody, guardianship, paternity
and child protection laws.
65. DeShaney v. Winnebago City Soc. Servs. Dep't., 489 U.S. 189, 212 (1988)
(Blackmun J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 202-03.
67. Id. at 212-13. (Blackmun J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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2. Judicial interpretation of state constitutions and the United States
Constitution to require the recognition of children as persons with
a right to due process when their custody is at stake. This due
process should include, at a minimum: the right to a hearing
wherein the effect of the custody decision on the child is weighed
equally against the interests of the parents; the child's right to
counsel; and the child's right to standing as an equal party to the
action.68
3. Reform of legal education, both in law school and after, to require
those who will practice in the field of family law to study the
effects of custody and visitation decisions on children and to be
encouraged to engage in interdisciplinary study of families and
their problens.
4. Advancement within the legal profession and the courts of alterna-
tives to "winner-takes-all" remedies in family law cases, includ-
ing, the promotion' of mediation at early stages of cases involving
a child's custody and creative solutions which begin to recognize
that children sometimes have several parent figures who may play
some role in the child's life. The physical possession of the child,
however, cannot be the only option as a means of furthering a
parent-child relationship.
5. Reform of court practices, from the lowest level state court to the
United States Supreme Court, to ensure that decisions concerning
the custody of children are made quickly and with finality. But,
when courts do not act quickly, it should not be the child who
pays the price.
There are often glimmers of hope as I look to a future where
children are treated by the courts with human dignity. Decisions
which are harmful to children often spark powerful and compelling
dissents. Trial courts, who have the most contact with the actual
people involved, will often make child-centered decisions which are
later reversed on appeal. And, sometimes, a judge will have the
courage to say that our legal system cannot tolerate decisions or laws
which treat children as less than human. Today, I can only hope and
imagine that these judges will someday be the authors of majority
decisions which will finally settle this issue for the good of all
children.
68. See Suellyn Scarnecchia, A Child's Right to Protection from Transfer Trauma in
a Contested Adoption Case, (forthcoming) 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y (No. 1 1995).
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